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1. Abstract/Overview   
   This paper outlines a formal recursive wager resolution calculus (WRC) that 
provides a novel conceptual framework for sentential logic via bridge rules that 
link wager resolution with truth values. When paired with a traditional truth-
centric criterion of logical soundness WRC generates a sentential logic that is 
broadly truth-conditional but not truth-functional, supports the rules of proof 
employed in standard mathematics, and is immune to the most vexing features 
of their traditional implementation.  
  WRC also supports a novel probabilistic criterion of logical soundness, the fair 
betting probability criterion (FBP). It guarantees that the conclusion of an FBP-
valid argument is at least as credible as a conjunction of premises, and also that 
the conclusion is true if the premises are. In addition, WRC provides a platform 
for a novel non-probabilistic, computationally simpler criterion of logical 
soundness – the criterion of Super-validity - that issues the same logical 
appraisals as FBP, and hence the same guarantees.  
2 Wager Resolution 
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 2.1 The General Structure of WRC 
 The scope of WRC is simple wagers with two payoffs – a single amount won and 
a single amount lost. WRC employs three wager resolution values: W, read as 
'won', L, read as 'lost', and K, read as 'neither won nor lost'. There are two 
semantic (or truth) values, t, read as 'true' and u, read as 'false’ and as ‘untrue'. 
WRC incorporates the idea that a gambler wins a wager if and only if (iff) his 
opponent loses it, and loses it iff his opponent wins it. Wager resolution and 
semantic values are bridged by the idea that a gambler wins a wager on a 
hypothesis H if H proves true and its wager-opposite d(H) - the hypothesis that 
his opponent bets on - proves false. A gambler loses a wager on H if d(H) 
proves true and H proves false. It follows that no party to a wager on H either 
wins or loses his bet if H and d(H) have the same truth-value. In this case H has 
the wager resolution value K.  
1.2 The formal Calculus.  
    The atomic formulae of the languages Λ of WRC are p, q and r with or 
without integer subscripts. In practical applications we select a language with 
enough atomic formulae to encode the propositions involved. The monadic 
sentence operators of WRC are the traditional contradictory generating 
operator, which is represented by the tilde symbol '∼', and the wager-opposite 
operator, which is represented by ‘d’.  The binary sentence operators of a 
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language Λ are represented by  ‘∩’, ‘∪’, ‘→’, and ‘⊃’. The intended colloquial 
readings of the first three in order are ‘and’, ‘and/or’ and ‘if .. then _’ and its 
cognates. Material conditional formulae of the form ‘H ⊃ S’ have the same truth 
and wager resolution conditions as the corresponding disjunction ∼ H ∪ S. 
   Grouping is accomplished by a standard use of parentheses. Uppercase letters 
‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ of the meta-language (with or without integer subscripts) 
represent formulae that are neither → formulae nor contain ‘→’ sub-formulae, 
i.e. are simple.  Uppercase letters from E through J, and M  through T of the 
meta-language (with or without subscripts) are not so restricted.  
  An interpretation of the formulae of a language Λ of WRC is an ordered pair 
consisting of a semantic value function s and a wager resolution value function 
v that are defined over the formulae of Λ. An interpretation <s,v> satisfies the 
following rules:  
   i) a) s(H) = t iff s(∼ H) = u 
   ii) If H is an atomic formula, s(d(H)) = s(∼ H);  
   iii) v(H) = W iff s(H) = t and s(d(H)) = u.  
   iv) v(H) = L iff s(H) = u and s(d(H)) = t.  
   v) v(H) = K iff s(H) = s(d(H) 











Question marks in a cell of WRM indicate that each of the two entries is prima 
facie plausible; the asterisk to the right of an entry indicates that it is the least 
problematic of the two and hence is the official entry. Rationales for asterisked 
entries are presented in the next section 
    Rules iii) iv) and v) bridge semantic and wager resolution values. Since s has 
two values, t and u, it follows from i) that s(H) ≠ t iff s(∼ H) ≠ u, whence s(H) = 
u iff s(∼ H) = t. It also follows that s(H) = s(∼ ( ∼ H)), and that that atomic 
formulae never have the value K. 
 H   S  d(S)  ∼ S H ∩ S  H ∪ S H → S  H ⊃ S 
1  W  W   L L*,K ?     W     W          W       W 
2  W  L  W  W*,K?    L         W      L         L 
3  W  K   K L*,K?  W*,K?     W     K* W?      K 
4   L  W  L L    L         W      K        W 
5   L  L  W W    L         L       K        W 
6   L  K  K L    L         L, K*?     K        W 
7   K  W L L W*,K?    W     W* K?      W 
8   K  L  W W    L         L, K*?     L* K?       L 
9   K  K  K L    K         K   K         K 
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   The entries for the d-column indicate that v(d(d(S))) = v(S), hence s(S) = 
s(d(d(S))). Rows 1, 2, 4 and 5 of WRM show that If H and S never have the 
value K, the only formulae formed from them that have the value K are either → 
formulae or formulae that have → sub-formulae. A formula that does not have 
the value K on any interpretation will be described as non-K. Simple formulae are 
non-K, but the converse has exceptions. For example, under WRM ∼ (H → S) is 
never K.  
   The entries on Rows 1 and 2 of WRM imply that if S is a non-K formula then 
s(d(S)) = s(∼ S)  and v(d(S)) = v(∼ S) . So the wager-opposite of a formula is its 
contradictory if the formula is non-K, but not if S can have the value K (because 
if S is K, then s(S) = s(d(S)).  
 3. Rationales for Asterisked Entries  
3.1. Negation. 
   We want the entries in the negation column to capture the intuition that a 
wager on a conjunction of a hypothesis and its contradictory is lost in all cases, 
e.g.,  a formula of the form  S ∩ ∼ S should be L in all cases. Entries for the ∩ 
column capture the uncontroversial idea that a wager on a conjunction is lost iff 
a separate wager on at least one conjunct would be lost. Thus if S is L, v(S ∩ ∼ 
S) = L. If S is W, satisfaction of the intuition requires v(∼ S) = L. Similarly if S is 
K satisfaction of the intuition requires an entry of L for ∼ S, hence the entry of 
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L for rows 1 and 3 of the negation column. In light of rule iv) the entry of L for 
row 3 implies that if S is K, s(∼ S) = u, whence by rule i) s(S) = t. This holds for 
all cases. So a formula that is K is t. It follows from bridge principle iv) that if S 
is L, as in row 2, then ∼ S is t and thus is either K or W. So for the entry on Row 
2 we have three alternatives: K, W, or leaving the choice between K or W open. 
The no choice policy would generate significant computational complexity, and a 
choosing K would lead to the undesirable result that a wager on the 
contradictory of a proposition is never won. W is the least problematic entry for 
Row 2.  
    The reader may have noticed that the result that a formula is t if it is K has 
profound consequences for the logic of conditionals. It implies that a conditional 
formula has the same truth-conditions as the corresponding ⊃ formula, i.e. the 
same truth-conditions as its material counterpart. A reader who is has a 
negative attitude to this Material Counterpart Rule (MCR, for short) might 
consider rejecting the rule that v(S ∩ ∼ S) = L in all cases in favor of the weaker 
rule that if S is K a wager on S ∩ ∼ S is K. But this would have the effect of 
conflating the negation operator with the wager-opposite operator. In addition,  
there is another compelling  intuition that supports the link between K and t: 
the intuition that a secondary wager on the hypothesis that a primary wager on 
a proposition will be won is won if the primary wager is won, and is lost 
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otherwise. For, in light of bridge principle iii)  ‘S ∩ ∼ d(S)’, ω(S) for short, 
encodes the hypothesis that a wager on S will be won. So a wager on the 
secondary hypothesis is tantamount to a wager on ω(S). Thus satisfaction of 
this intuition requires a wager resolution value of L for ω(S) when S is K. If S is 
K; then ∼ d(S) must be L in order for ω(S) to be L ; in that case ∼ d(S) is u 
whence d(S) is t and so is S so we  have the same general result: s(S) = t if v(S) 
is K.  
    It follows that d(S) does not imply ∼ S, but the converse holds, hence ∼ d(S) 
and ∼ S are logically incompatible.  
    Finding colloquial readings of the wager-opposite operator and the negation 
operator that captures the same work they do for non-K propositions and the 
different work that they do for K propositions is a challenging task. I propose 
reading formulae of the form d(S) as ‘It is not the case that S’ and also as ‘Its is 
false that S’, and reading ∼ S as ‘The proposition that S is not true [or is 
false/untrue] untrue’. If S is correctly represented by a non-K formula ∼ S  and 
d(S) such have the same truth and wager resolution conditions (as shown by 
rows 1 and 2); but if S is a conditional or logically embeds conditionals  we 
should see the difference between the two operators indicated by row 3. The 
entries for conditionals show this, as explained in section 3.3.  
.  
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3.2 Conjunction.  
An entry of K in the cells on rows 3 and 7 of the conjunction column, in concert 
with rule that a wager on a conditional is K when its antecedent proves false, 
would indicate that a wager on the intuitive tautology represented by  
(A → A ) ∩ (∼ A → ∼ A) is never lost but cannot be won (because then it is K on 
all interpretations).  Ditto for the intuitive tautology (∼ A → ∼ A ) ∩ (A →  A). 
Rejecting this strange  in favor of the thesis that wagers on such tautologies is 
won in all cases requires an entry of W on rows 3 and 7. Another 
counterintuitive consequence of an entry of K on these rows is shown by the 
following example. Suppose that a coin is to be tossed three times and that a 
bet is proposed on the conjunctive hypothesis that if exactly one heads is 
tossed (A), the first toss will be heads (C) and that if exactly two heads are 
tossed (B), the first toss will be heads (C). This hypothesis is encoded by a 
formula of the form (A → C) ∩ (B → C). In light of the relatively uncontroversial 
entries on rows 1 and 5 of the → column and the observation that A and B 
cannot both be true, if one conjunct is W the other is K. Thus an entry of K on 
rows 3 and 7 would indicate that a wager on this conjunction is not won. 
However, the proposition that if A or B, C is typically understood as saying the 
same thing as the conjunction, hence it should have the same resolution 
conditions as a wager on the conjunction. In light of the uncontroversial entries 
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for ∪ and → the formula  (A ∪ B) → C is W if A and C are W and B is L. Thus an 
entry of W on rows 3 and 7 is required to capture the intuition that the 
conditional has the same wager resolution conditions as the conjunction.  
3.3 Entries in the → Column  
   In light of the grammatical work done by ‘if’ described in standard English 
dictionaries, that of introducing a subordinate clause of supposition or 
condition, a proposal of the form 'I will bet you x dollars that S if H' will be 
interpreted as the proposal of a wager of x dollars on S that is conditional on 
the truth of H: if H proves false the wager is void, and if H proves true, the 
wager is won if a wager on S would be won under the circumstances, is lost if a 
wager on S would be lost under the circumstances, and is neither won nor lost   
if a wager on S would neither be won nor lost under the circumstances. This is 
clearly captured by the entries in rows 1-6. and also by the entries on rows 7-9 
(in light of the theorem that a formula is t if it is K). A consequence of these 
wager resolution conditions is that if H is either W or K, v(H → S) = v(S),  and 
v(H → S) = K if H is L.  
    If H and S are simple then the established practice of resolving wagers on 
conditionals with simple antecedents and consequents is captured by the 
entries on 1,2, 4 and 5. For, these entries indicate that a wager on 'If A, C' is 
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won if A and C prove true, is lost if A proves true and C false, and is neither won 
nor lost when A proves false.  
  A consequence of these entries is that the formula d(H → S) has the  same 
wager resolution conditions and hence the same semantic value as the 
conditional contrary of H S, i.e.,  of H → d(S).  Thus the conditional contrary of 
H → S is also wager-opposite of it. A wager on it is won if H proves true and S 
proves false, is lost if H and S prove true, and is neither won nor lost if H proves 
false. On the other hand, a wager on ∼ (H → S) is won if H proves false and S 
proves true, and is and is lost otherwise. The wager-opposite of a conditional is 
not equivalent to its contradictory.  
  From the standpoint of WRC the criterion of sound encoding is sameness of 
wager resolution conditions, not sameness of truth conditions. With this in 
mind,  these results are consistent with the readings proposed above. For, in 
light of the grammatical work done by ‘if, statements of the forms ‘It is not the 
case [or false] that if H, S' have the same intuitive wager resolution conditions 
as corresponding statements of the form ‘Under the supposition or condition 
that that H, it is not the case [or false] that H. The latter does the same work in 
cooperative exchanges of information as that 'If H, it is not the case [false] that 
S. Under the established practice of resolving wagers on colloquial conditionals, 
wagers on ‘If H, it is not the case that S’ are won if H proves true and S proves 
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false, are lost if H and S prove true , and are neither won not lost if H proves 
true. On the other hand, wagers on hypotheses of the form ‘The proposition 
that if H, S’ is not true [false]’ are intuitively won if the proposition that if H, S 
proves false and are lost otherwise. They are aptly encoded by a formula of the 
form  ∼ (H → S), which has these wager resolution conditions.  
    3.4 Disjunction and MCR.  The asterisked entries on rows 6 and 8 of the ∪ 
column reflect reluctance to judge a wager on a disjunction as lost unless 
separate wagers on both disjuncts are lost. It also captures the intuition that a 
wager on an inclusive disjunction is won iff a wager on at least one disjunct 
would be won.  
The entries for H ⊃ S are the wager resolution values of the corresponding 
entries of ∼ H ∪ S.  
  3.5 McDermott's Wager Resolution Calculus. 
   In his [1996] M. McDermott explored the links between wager resolution and 
logic by identifying semantic values with wager resolution values: truth with 
won, falsehood with lost, and neither won nor lost with a third semantic value X, 
which he treated both as 'neither won nor lost' and as 'neither true nor false' 
His calculus of wager resolution/truth-value does not employ a special wager-
opposite operator in addition to a negation operator, and none of the 
alternative treatments of conjunction and disjunction he proposed uniformly 
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matches WRM's. His interesting approach piqued my interest in exploring the 
constraints placed on semantically bivalent sentential logics by a wager 
resolution calculus with bivalent bridge rules and a wager-opposite operator.   
4. Some Important Definitions and Consequences of WRM. .  
4.1 t-validity  
  Definition: a formal argument form S1, S2 … Sn ∴ H is t-valid  iff there is no 
interpretation on which the premises are all t and the conclusion is u. In light of 
the identification of K and W with t and L with u this is criterion does the same 
work as a criterion that treats S1, S2 … Sn ∴ H as logically sound  iff there is 
no interpretation on which the premises are either W or K  and the conclusion H 
is L. 
 In light of the link between K and t the truth-conditions of  ∼, ∩, ∪, and ⊃ 
formulae rules match the negation, conjunction, disjunction and material 
conditional operators of  classical sentential logic. Hence argument forms that 
contain just these operators are t-valid under WRC iff they are valid under the 
traditional truth-centric criterion of logical soundness. This does not hold for 
arguments that contain conditionals.  
 4.2 Super-Equivalence.   
    Sameness of truth-conditions is defined as t-equivalence, and sameness of 
wager resolution conditions is super-equivalence. Super-equivalence is 
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tantamount to joint t-equivalence and t-equivalence of wager opposites. Proof 
of this claim: t-equivalence of S and H is incompatible with rows 2,4,6 and 8 of 
WRM, and t-equivalence of d(H) and d(S)  is incompatible with rows 3 and 7. So 
the t-equivalence of H with S and of d(H) with d(S) is compatible only with rows 
1, 5 and 9. In these rows H and S have the same wager resolution value. 
Conversely, if H and S are super-equivalent then rows 1, 5 and 9 and no others 
obtain, hence d(H) is t-equivalent to d(S)  
  The entries on rows 4,5 and 6 show that conditionals are t-equivalent but not 
super-equivalent to their material counterparts. It will be shown that the lack of 
super-equivalence drives significant logical wedges between conditionals and 
their material counterparts – wedges that defang, disarm or dissolve many 
problematic features of the traditional implementation of MCR.  
    The entries for negation show that S is t-equivalent but not super-equivalent 
to ∼ (∼ S). On the other hand d(d(S)) is super-equivalent to S and hence t-
equivalent to it.  
  4.3 Truth-hypotheses  
   Intuitively a wager on a hypothesis of the form ‘S is true’ is won if S proves 
true and is lost otherwise. Wagers on truth-hypotheses are thus either won or 
lost, never canceled in principle.  WRC has the tools to capture the difference 
between wagers on S and wagers on ‘S is true’: the formula ∼ S ∩ d(S) , λ(S) for 
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short, is L iff S is either W or K, hence d(λ(S)) is W and t if S is t, and is L and u 
if S is u. It is never K – it is a non-K  formula. Thus, d(λ(A→ C)) has the wager 
resolution profile of ‘The proposition that C if A is true’ but not of ‘A → C’.  
   It will be shown in section 5.4 that in concert with the time-honored idea that 
fair betting odds in favor of a proposition are measures of a warranted degree 
of confidence in it, a warranted degree of confidence that C if A is typically less 
than a warranted degree of confidence that it will prove true that C if A: the 
latter can be quite high while the former is zero. This difference reflects the 
difference in wager resolution profiles  
4.4 Properties of the Wager Opposite operator.    
  The wager-opposite operator is not truth-functional. For example, S is t-
equivalent to ∼(∼ S), but d(S) is not t-equivalent to d(∼(∼ S)). For, if S is K, d(S) 
is K and t, but  d(∼ (∼ S)) is L and u. More generally, substitution of a formula 
that is t-equivalent to S for S in a formula of the form d(S) may not have the 
same semantic value as the original. On the other hand, if S is super-equivalent 
to R, d(S) and d(R) are super-equivalent as well. Since the wager resolution 
conditions of a formula are a determinate function of the wager resolution 
conditions of its sub-formulae in situ substitution of a formula for a super-
equivalent sub-formula does not change overall wager resolution conditions and 
thus truth-conditions.  
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   An important example of the non-truth-functional character of the wager-
opposite operator is revealed by a comparison of the →  column with the  ⊃ 
column of WRM; it shows that d(H → S) is not t-equivalent to d(H ⊃ S) even 
though H → S  is t-equivalent to  H ⊃ S. For, d(H → S) is K and hence t on rows 
4,5 and 6 whereas d(H ⊃ S) is L and u on these rows. The wager-opposite of a 
material counterpart of a conditional with non-K antecedent and consequent is a 
contradictory of it, but a wager-opposite of the conditional is not a 
contradictory of it.  
     This logical wedge between conditionals and their material counterparts 
disarms a major complaint about MCR – that it treats as logically sound 
colloquial non-sequiturs of the forms ‘It not the case that if H, S, therefore H 
and not-S’. An example: ‘It is not the case that if it rains the game will be 
canceled ; therefore, it will rain and the game will not be canceled'. This absurd 
argument  is logically sound under the traditional implementation of MCR 
because it recommends encoding  propositions of the forms 'It is not the case 
that if H, S' when H and S are simple by a formula of the form ∼ (H ⊃ S), which 
implies both H and ∼ S. In his [2001]. Lycan describes examples of this sort as 
“the worst material implication paradox of all”, and claimed that no treatment of 
indicative conditionals, in particular, MCR, “can be right that does not explain 
the outrageously evident invalidity of that inference pattern”. However, WRC's 
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implementation of MCR offers a cogent explanation: it supports encoding 
propositions that are expressed by sentences of the form 'It is not the case 
that if H, S' by a formula of the form  d(H → S). The latter is super-equivalent 
to H → d(S) which does not imply either H or ∼ S. So if H and S are simple, H → 
d(S) is t-equivalent to H → ∼ S and hence to  H ⊃ ∼ S, which does not entail H, 
and does not entail ∼ S.  For a similar reason, WRC disarms the bogus compliant 
that MCR per se treats as valid the colloquial non-sequitur 'It is not the case 
that S if H; therefore H if S'. 
   Another example of the mistake of treating the wager-opposite of a 
conditional as its contradictory is Edgington's tongue-in-cheek "favorite proof 
of the existence of God", which she mistakenly interprets as a counterexample 
to MCR per se, rather than as a counterexample to its traditional 
implementation.    
'If God doesn’t exist (not-G) then it is not the case that if I pray (P), 
my prayers will be answered (A), I do not pray; therefore God exists. 
(Edgington [2001] p.394). 
 This argument is an intuitive non-sequitur. But from the standpoint of WRC it is 
not, as Edgington claimed, an instance of an MCR -valid argument form. 
Edgington probably assumed that MCR per se warrants encoding the argument 
by  ∼ G ⊃ ∼ (P ⊃ A),  ∼ P ∴ G , which is t-valid. However, from the standpoint of 
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WRC the form of the colloquial argument is correctly represented by ∼ G → d(P 
→ A), ∼ P ∴ G. And since d(P → A) is super-equivalent to P → d(A) and hence 
to P → ∼ A (because A is simple), the latter may be substituted for d(P → A) in 
situ. The result of such substitution is  ∼ G  → (P → ∼ A), which  is super-
equivalent to (∼ G ∩ P) → ∼ A. The material counterpart of the latter is (∼ G ∩ 
P) ⊃ ∼ A, which does not imply G in concert with ∼ P. (Note that the material 
counterpart of a stand-alone conditional premise may be used for a truth-value 
analysis of an argument). 
4.5  Wager-opposites and Logical Incompatibility  
    If a hypothesis and its wager-opposite are both true, they will be described as 
trivially true. Some readers may interpret the trivial truth of  A → C and its 
wager-opposite A → ∼ C when A is u under WRC as proof that WRC is flawed 
because it is incapable of capturing the intuitive sense of opposition between 
colloquial conditionals and their wager opposites. However, this "proof" ignores 
potent pragmatic sources of intuitive opposition: since a wager on a hypothesis 
is won iff a wager on its wager-opposite is lost a wager on a conjunction of A → 
∼ C  and A → C cannot be won. More generally, d(S ∩ d(S)), which represents 
the schema ‘It is not the case that both S and not-S’, is a tautology of WRC. In 
addition, it will be shown that the credibility  of a conditional is low if the 
credibility of its wager-opposite is high,  and vice versa.. 
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    The pragmatics of everyday cooperative exchanges of information provide 
additional sources of the sense of opposition. For example, the assertion, 
without qualification, of a hypothesis S in such an exchange signals, but does 
not explicitly say, that the speaker judges S to be more credible than the 
hypothesis that it is not the case that S. In light of the grammatical work done 
by 'if', to signal that one judges that it is significantly more credible than not 
that C if A is to signal that that the speaker judges C significantly more credible 
than not-C on the supposition that A. So asserting that C if A without 
qualification, followed by an assertion, without qualification, that not-C if A 
conveys the self-defeating signal that on the supposition that A C is both 
significantly more credible than not-C and that not-C is significantly more 
credible than C.  
   Readers who remain unconvinced that the sense of opposition between an 
indicative  conditional and wager-opposites is not logical  may demand a clear 
example of a conditional and its wager-opposite that are both true on a realistic 
scenario. The Voting Example presented in the next section is such an example. 
It is not a one-off in light of the accompanying recipe for constructing such 
pairs. This recipe makes it clear that the number of such examples is limited 
only by a lack of imagination.   
 4.6 The Voting Example  
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     A background assumption of the Voting Example is that Smith and Jones 
each decide to vote in an upcoming election with two candidates, a republican 
and a democrat, by independently tossing a fair coin: Smith will vote for the 
republican candidate if heads is the result of his toss and for the democrat 
candidate if tails, and Jones will follow the same practice for his toss. Consider 
the hypothesis that Smith and Jones will both vote for the republican (C) if they 
vote for the same candidate (A). Smith and Jones agree to a wager in which 
Smith bets on the hypothesis that if A,C  and Jones bets on its wager opposite 
if A, it is not the case that C. ‘H’ stands for ‘Smith will toss heads ’ and ‘T’ for 
‘Jones will toss tails. ‘R’ stands for Smith will vote for the republican candidate, 
and ‘D’ stands for Jones will vote for the democratic candidate. In light of the 
background assumptions, the hypothesis that if A, C follows from R which in 
turn is a consequence of H, Similarly, the hypothesis that if A, it is not the case 
that C' follows from D which follows from T. Under the time-honored principle of 
the monotonicity of deductive entailment both conditional hypotheses follow 
from the conjunction of H and T. So if Smith tosses heads and Jones tails the 
hypotheses respectively represented by 'If A, C' and 'If A, it is not the case that 
C' are both true, in which case no party to the wager wins or loses their wager, 
not because the truth-value of the conditional and its wager-opposite are 
difficult to ascertain, but because they are both clearly true.  
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    Even if the reader does not find the appeal to monotonicity compelling, 
he/she should find compelling the thesis that if H and T prove true there are no 
grounds to treat either conditional as false. This leaves two options, neither 
conditional has a truth-value (the “nuclear” option) or both are true. The 
assumption of bivalence is consistent only with the latter. In his seminal 
discussion of his Riverboat Example, Gibbard [1981] chose the nuclear option 
on the ground that the intuitive opposition between a conditional and its 
conditional contrary rules out joint truth. However, once it is seen that the 
intuitive sense of opposition between ‘If A, C’ and ‘If A, not-C’ is plausible 
explained by the pragmatics of wagering and of conditionals, the joint truth 
thesis is more reasonable than the nuclear option. Moreover, in light of the 
foregoing arguments and more to come, the logical infirmities of MCR alleged in 
the literature are infirmities its traditional implementation, and are largely 
disarmed by WRC. Add to this the observation that  logics that incorporate the 
joint truth option both capture the traditional rules of demonstrative proof of 
standard mathematics and the case for joint truth is compelling.  
   A recipe for constructing examples like the Voting Example : articulate 
propositions R, D, C, A  and plausible background assumptions B  such that A 
and C are simple,  R is logically consistent with D, in concert with B R implies 
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that C on the supposition that A, and D implies, in concert with B, that ‘It is not 
the case that C on the supposition that A.  
5. Absurd Instances and Credibility 
  5.1 Absurd Colloquial Instances of t-valid Argument Forms 
   I have not yet addressed the most serious objection to MCR in the literature –
patterns of reasoning with conditional conclusions that are t-valid in concert 
with MCR but have absurd instances – instances that are obvious non-sequiturs. 
A list of such argument forms would include, in addition to the so-called 
“paradoxes of material implication”, stalwarts of reasoning with conditionals in 
standard mathematics and a host of technical disciplines, e.g., Inference to the 
Contrapositive, the Hypothetical Syllogism, and Strengthening the Antecedent.   
   First, some definitions. A colloquial argument R1, R2, ... Rn ∴ F is an instance 
of a formal argument form S1, S2 … Sn ∴ H  (Φ, for short) iff for all i, Si 
correctly encodes Ri  and H correctly encodes F. The looseness of the concept 
of 'correct encoding' is not a problem for our treatment of absurd instances.  
    A hypothesis is trivially true  on a possible scenario (or state of affairs)  iff it 
is true and its wager-opposite is also true on it.  In light of the link between K 
and the semantic value t, a conditional is trivially true iff its antecedent is false.  
A proposition is non-trivially true on a scenario if the proposition is true on it 
and its colloquial wager-opposite is false on it. A proposition is absurd if its 
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wager-opposite is true on all realistic scenarios. A colloquial instance of an 
argument form is absurd iff its conclusion is absurd and a conjunction of its 
premises is non-trivially true on some realistic scenarios, and is thus credible on 
them.  
   An absurd instance of Inference to the Contrapositive follows: 
If it rains in Boston tomorrow (B) it will not rain hard in Boston 
tomorrow (not-H); therefore if it rains hard in Boston tomorrow (H), it 
will not rain in Boston tomorrow (not-B).  
The instance is formally encoded by B → ∼ H ∴ H → ∼ B. H → B encodes a 
wager-opposite of the conclusion. Since the colloquial wager-opposite of the 
conclusion represents an analytically true proposition for practical purposes the 
conclusion is absurd. The premise is non-trivially true on scenarios in which 
Boston will experience only a few light showers tomorrow. Despite its evident 
absurdity the instance does not constitute a strict logical counterexample 
because the conclusion is trivially true if the premise is true. For, on the 
supposition that H B follows from the true wager opposite, and the 
contradictory of H follows from B and the premise. Thus H is false if the premise 
is true whence the conclusion is trivially true if the premise is true. The strategy 
of deriving the trivial truth of the conclusion via Indirect Proof and Modus 
Ponens and other noncontroversial rules of proof works for all absurd instances 
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with conditional conclusions.  For example, suppose that the argument A → B, B 
→ C ∴ A → C represents an absurd instance of the Hypothetical Syllogisms. The 
wager-opposite of the conclusion is represented by A → ∼ C, and may presumed 
true on all scenarios on which the premises are true.  Under the supposition that 
A, it follows from the premises and the wager-opposite that both C and  ∼ C ( 
by two applications of Modus Ponens). So if the premises are t, A is u and the 
conclusion is trivially true. This analysis does not beg the question by 
presupposing MCR directly because it is grounded in the entries in WRM for 
negation. The bottom line is that absurd instances are not strict logical 
counterexamples to the join of MCR and t-validity 
    Absurd instances of t-valid argument forms are intuitive non-sequiturs 
because their conclusions are incredible on all realistic scenarios and a 
conjunction of the premises is credible on some realistic scenarios. The idea that 
an instance of a t-valid argument can have a fairly credible premises and in 
incredible conclusion may appear to incompatible with the theorem that the 
standard probability of the conditional conclusion of a t-valid argument must be 
at least as great as the standard probability of a conjunction of premises. But it 
is not because standard probabilities of truth are not reliable measures of the 
credibility of conditionals. The following plausible probabilistic treatment of the 
Rain Example shows this.   
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   5.2 Probability and the Rain Example  
    Suppose that a standard probability function P represents a statistically 
grounded forecast for tomorrow’s weather in Boston. In general  'P(S)' 
represents the likelihood that S will prove true (because standard probability is 
probability of truth). Since it is impossible that both H and not-B, P(H ∩ ∼ B) = 
0. Suppose that that P(B) = .5 and that P(B ∩ ∼ H) = .45; it follows that P(B ∩ 
H) = .05 = P(H),  and that P(∼ H) = .95. The zero likelihood of H ∩ ∼ B indicates 
that ∼ B has zero credibility on the supposition that H, i.e., that it is incredible 
that it will not rain in Boston tomorrow if (on the supposition that) it will rain 
hard in Boston tomorrow. On the other hand, the premise is intuitively credible 
because on the supposition that B ∼ H is 9 times more likely than H. This 
credibility inequality holds despite their t-equivalence and the equality of their 
standard probabilities. Since, H → ∼ B  is true if and only H ⊃ ∼ B is true, and 
since P is a standard probability function and thus assigns equal numbers to t-
equivalent propositions, P(H → ∼ B)  equals P(H ⊃ ∼ B) = P( ∼ H) + P(H ∩ ∼ B)) = 
.95 + 0. All of this .95 probability of truth is probability of trivial truth. Similarly 
P(B → ∼ H) = P( ∼ B) + P(B ∩ ∼ H)) = .5 + .45 = .95. We may conclude that The 
standard probability of a conditional is not a reliable measure of its credibility 
because it may not equal the probability of its consequent on given that or on 
the supposition that its antecedent is true. A plausible explanation of this 
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phenomenon is that it reflects the difference in wager resolution conditions of a 
conditional and the hypothesis that it will prove true: a wager on ‘If H, not-B 
cannot be won (because the conjunction of H and not-B is impossible), and a 
wager on the hypothesis that if H, not-B will prove true is won if H proves false. 
This strongly suggests that an apposite measure of the credibility of  
conditionals, and of propositions in general, is a function of the likelihood of 
potential wager outcomes.  
    Gamblers have used such a measure for centuries: fair betting odds in favor - 
the ratio of the likelihood of winning to the likelihood of losing. In view of bridge 
principles iii) – v) this ratio equals the probability of non-trivial truth divided by 
the likelihood of falsehood. For the Rain Example the fair betting odds in favor 
of the conclusion equal zero, but for the t-equivalent premise they equal .45 ÷ 
.05 = 9, or 9 to one in gambler’s parlance. However, fair betting odds for both 
the hypothesis that the premise is true and for the hypothesis that conclusion is 
true equals .95 ÷ .05 = 19 to one, which indicates a very high degree of 
credence. This is possible because these odds take reflect the likelihood of 
trivial truth, whereas odds in favor of the conclusion and premise reflect only 
the likelihood of non-trivial truth.  P(ω(S) ÷ P(λ(S), represents the ratio of the 
likelihood of nontrivial truth to the likelihood of falsehood; this is the ratio that 
is of interest to gamblers considering a proposed wager on S.   
	 26	
  We have seen that the fair betting odds measure of credibility does not require 
that t-valid propositions have the same measure of credibility. This disarms D. 
Edgington’s  [1995] influential “credibility gap” argument against MCR.  The 
main premise of her argument is the thesis that if a logical theory implies that a 
conditional has the same truth-conditions as a given proposition, and 
intellectually competent and probability literate persons can have a high degree 
of confidence in the given proposition and a low degree of confidence in the 
conditional, or vice-versa, then this is strong evidence that the theory is wrong. 
This claim presupposes that for statements that have truth-conditions, i.e., that 
express propositions, credibility goes by the likelihood of truth. The Rain 
Example and others of the same kind show that such a person can indeed have 
a high degree of confidence in the material counterpart of a conditional and a 
low degree of confidence in the conditional and that this is explained by the fair 
betting odds measure of credibility. Since this measure is time-honored and 
cogent Edgington’s argument is disarmed.  
     The case for the cogency of the fair betting odds cum fair betting 
probability measure is firmed up by the following discussion   
5.3 Fair Betting Odds in Favor. 
   A rationale for the fair betting odds measure of credibility exploits the 
observation that  the maximum ratio of risk to gain an probability savvy and 
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economically prudent gambler G is willing to tolerate in a simple straight up 
wager Wag on a hypothesis S (max(S) for short) is a sound measure of his 
degree of confidence that S: the higher G’s max is, the greater his degree of 
confidence is S, and the lower max is the weaker is his degree of confidence. If 
an apposite standard probability function P defined over the possible outcomes 
of Wag is at hand then P determines G’s max for S in concert with Decision 
Theory, the theory of economically prudent choice among risky and uncertain 
alternatives. The theory holds that if the sums of money associated with a Wag 
are small in relation to G’s total fortune and P(λ(S)) is not zero then G’s max(S) 
should equal P(ω(S) ÷ P(λ(S) - the ratio of the probability that a wager on S will 
be won to the probability that it will be lost, i.e., fair betting odds in favor of S. 
For, according to Decision Theory participation in Wag is economically prudent if 
the expected gain, i.e. potential gain times the probability of winning, is greater 
than expected loss - potential loss times the probability of losing-  and is 
imprudent if the reverse. So if the posted ratio of potential loss (risk) to 
potential gain – the posted odds in favor of S - is greater than fair betting odds 
in favor, then expected loss is greater than expected gain, whence participation 
would be imprudent. Conversely, if the posted odds are less than fair betting 
odds, participation is economically prudent because then expected gain  is 
greater than expected loss. If posted odds in favor of S equal fair betting odds 
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in favor of S, P(ω(S)) ÷ P(λ(S)) then the wager is fair – fair because expected 
gain equals expected loss, whence no party to the wager has a advantage over 
his opponent. So fair betting odds in favor of S constitute a warranted measure 
of a probability savvy and economically prudent gambler’s degrees of 
confidence that S. Fair betting odds in favor may thus be described as a 
measure of the credibility of S relative to P.  
     We have seen that if S can have the value K there can be a large difference 
between the fair betting odds in favor of S and the fair betting odds in favor of 
the hypothesis that S is true. The former equals P(ω(S) ÷ P(λ(S) and the latter 
equals P(ω(S) ∪ κ(S)) ÷ P(λ(S) where κ(S) is the probability of cancelation, i.e., 
the probability of trivial truth. The numerator equals P(S) = the standard 
probability that S is true relative to P. If S is non-K, P(κ(S)) = 0.   
5.4 Fair Betting Probability/ Fair Betting Quotients  
  The fair betting odds measure of credibility is numerically unbounded, and thus 
is computationally less convenient than a normalized version of the odds 
measure that pairs maximum credibility with a real number, say one, and 
minimum credibility with zero, and increases when fair betting odds do and 
decreases when they do. The fair betting probability function P* determined by 
fair betting of odds does this job. It identifies P*(S) with the maximum ratio of 
potential loss to the sum of potential loss and potential gain that an 
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economically prudent gambler is willing to tolerate for a wager on S.  This ratio 
is determined by fair betting odds in favor and is traditionally described as the 
fair betting quotient for wagers on S. Simple algebra shows that if O(S) is the 
fair betting odds in favor of S,  P*(S) = O(S) ÷ [O(S) + 1]. Thus If O(S) ≥ O(R) 
iff P*(S) ≥ P*(R). Simple algebra also shows that  
P*(S) = P(ω(S) ÷[P((ω(S)) + P(λ(S))] provided that O(S) is defined. Under this 
proviso P*(S) = P(ω(S)/(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)), which represents the conditional 
probability that a wager on S will be won given that it is either won or lost. It 
also represents conditional probability that S is non-trivially true given that it is 
either false or non-trivially true. If S is non-K, P(ω(S) + P(λ(S) = 1 and P(ω(S) = 
P(S) hence  P*(S) = P(S). 
   In order to treat P* as a function whose domain is the same as that of P, we 
treat P*(S) as 1 if P((ω(S)) + P(λ(S))] = 0. In this case 1 does not represent 
maximal credibility. Fair betting quotients were labeled ‘probabilities’ by the 17th 
and 18th century pioneers of the theory of mathematical probability. I will follow 
this tradition. Formalists may  complain that since the standard probability that 
S is a measure of the likelihood of its truth, and P*(S) is primarily a measure of 
the likelihoods of winning or losing a wager on S, it is not correctly described as 
a probability that S. However, P*(S) is equal to P'(S) where P' is a standard 
probability function derived from P by conditionalization on ω(S) ∪ λ(S). So not 
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only is P*(S) is formally a probability that S , it is correctly described as the 
practically relevant standard probability that S for the appraisal of proposed 
wagers on S.   
   This observation has relevance to the widely accepted interpretation of the 
thesis that given a standard probability function P  P(C/A) is a  correct measure 
of the probability that ‘C if A’ (presuming that A and C are simple), i.e., should 
equal P(A → C) because ‘the probability that C if {on the supposition that or 
given that A is correctly represented by P(C/A).  My label for this thesis is the 
Limited Conditional Probability Rule, LCPR, for short. Since standard probability 
is probability of truth this thesis is incompatible with MCR except for some 
trivial cases, e.g. when P(C) = P(A ∩ C). For this reason D.K. Lewis [1976], who 
argued against trashing MCR, proposed treating P(C/A) as the “assertability” of 
the proposition that C if A. Although the link between the concept of 
assertability and degree of credibility is not direct, it is reasonable to assume 
that intuitive credibility measured by P(C/A) “rubs off” onto degree of 
assertability. Frank  Jackson, who similarly endorsed MCRC, replaced Lewis’s 
degree of assertability by a concept of degree of “assertibility”. Jackson treated 
an assertibility version of Adams’s criterion of probabilistic validity as a 
complementary criterion of logical soundness that roots out some – and I 
emphasize ‘some’ blatant non-sequiturs that are instances of MCR + t-valid 
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argument forms. The reason for ‘some’ is that Adams’s probability logic does 
not treat formulae that have conditional sub-formulae.  
    On the other hand, under the fair betting probability measure of credibility 
P(C/A) is aptly described as a measure of the credibility that C if A, and , for 
good measure , is properly described as the practically relevant standard 
probability that ‘C if A’.  probability that C if A relative to given P and also as 
the practically relevant p. In other words, P*(A → C) = P(C/A) if P(A) > 0. For, 
P*(A → C) = P(ω(A → C)/(ω(A → C) ∪ λ( A → C)), which equals P(A ∩ C) ÷ 
{P(A ∩ C) + P(A ∩ ∼ C)] =  P(A ∩ C) ÷ P(A) = P(C/A). So under the fair betting 
odds criterion of credibility, the fair betting probability that C if A is P(C/A). 
Moreover, P*(A → C) is properly described as a probability because it equals 
P’(A → C) where P’ is the standard probability function derived from P by 
conditionalization on A. The rationale for the label 'limited' is that If S and H are 
not simple, then P*(S → H) may not equal P(H/S). For example P*(A → (B → C)) 
= P(A ∩ B ∩ C) ÷ P(A ∩ B) = P(C/A ∩ B), which equals P(B → C/A) only if P(A ∩ 
∼ B) = 0. 
   Since the hypothesis that C if A will prove true is typically not super-
equivalent to the hypothesis that C if A, two fair betting probabilities are 
associated with 'C if A': P*(A → C), which equals P(C/A) if P(A) > 0,  and the 
fair betting probability that A → C  is true, which equals P*(d(λ(A → C))). Since 
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d(λ(A → C) is non-K its fair betting probability equals P(d(λ(A → C))) = P(A ⊃ 
C) = P(A → C). Thus P*(A → C) equals the fair betting quotient/ fair betting 
probability for wagers on A → C, and P(A → C) equals the fair betting 
quotient/fair betting probability that A → C is true.  
   More generally, it is proved in Section 7.2 that P*(S) = P(S) only if P(ω(S) ∪ 
λ(S)) equals either 1or zero or P(ω(S), and is less than P(S) when neither of 
these “trivial” cases holds.  
5.6  Some Salient Properties of Fair Betting Probability Functions 
P* is not formally a standard probability function because it doesn't satisfy the 
additivity condition and may not assign the same number to t-equivalent 
propositions. However, it assigns the same number to super-equivalent 
propositions.  
    The theorem that P*(d(S) = 1- P*(S) is proved below 
   Fair betting probability functions are more nuanced than their parent standard 
probability function. For, if S can have the wager resolution value K, there may 
be no proposition R in the domain of P such that P(R) = P*(S). On the other 
hand, for every S in the scope of P there is a formula R, in particular d(λ(S)),  
such that P*(R) = P(S).  
6  The Fair Betting Probability Criterion of Logical Soundness and the Criterion 
of Super-validity.  
	 33	
 6.1 The fair betting probability measure supports a novel MCR-compatible CRED 
criterion of logical soundness that complements t-validity. Definition:  Suppose 
that S1, S2, … Sn, and H are formulae of a language Λ of WRC. Then  S1, S2, … 
Sn  ∴ H  is fair betting probability valid (FBP-valid for short) iff   
P*(S1 ∩ S2 ∩ .. ∩ Sn ) ≤ P*(H)  for all standard probability functions P  defined 
over Λ.  It is proved in Section 7.3 that FBP-validity implies t-validity. 
 6.2 Some Examples:  
  Under FBP The rule of Conditional Proof does not hold.  Some arguments that 
are cited in defense of MCR, e.g., by Jackson [1987] are not FBP-valid. For 
example, ‘Either A or C, therefore if not-A then C’. If P(C/ ∼ A) = 0, P(A ∪ C) 
can be non-zero. On the other hand, the argument ‘It is true that either A or C, 
therefore it is true that if not-A then C  is FPB valid because the conclusion 
does not have the wager resolutions of the conditional conclusion: its P* value 
equals P(A) + P(~ A ∩ C)  which equals the standard probability of the premise, 
i.e., P(A ∪ C). In general, the “truth” version of a t-valid argument is FPB valid 
because P*(S is true) = P(S).  
    Under FBP The rule of Conditional Proof does not hold: the FPB validity of  
‘S, A ∴ C does not imply the FBP-validity of S ∴ A → C 
    All t-valid argument forms with absurd instances  are not FPB-valid. This is 
because the conditional conclusion of an FBP-valid argument is at least as 
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credible as the credibility of a conjunction of premises, so if the conclusion has 
zero credibility and a conjunction of premises has non-zero credibility the 
argument is not FBP valid. The following  examples show this. Inference to the 
Contrapositive is not FBP-valid. For, P*(A → C) = P(C/A) and  P*(∼ C → ∼ A) = 
P(∼ A/∼ C). The latter can be zero when P(C/A) is non-zero, e.g. when  P(∼ C ∩ 
∼ A) = 0 and P(C ∩ A) > 0. The celebrated paradoxes of material implication ∼ A 
∴ A → C and C ∴ A → C, are not FPB valid. For since A is simple, P*( ∼ A) = P(∼ 
A) and P*(A → C) = P(C/A). The latter can be zero when P(∼ A) is not zero. 
Similarly C ∴ A → C is not FPB valid because P*(C) = P(C), which can be non-
zero when P(C/A) is zero.  
   Consider, for example,  the Hypothetical Syllogism. To test for FBP-validity we 
have to first determine a formula for the values of P(ω[(A → B) ∩ (B→ C)]  and 
P(ω[(A → B) ∩ (B→ C)] ∪ λ[(A → B) ∩ (B→ C)]. WRM shows that ω((A → B) ∩ 
(B→ C)) is W iff  B ∩ C is W (note that B and C are simple), and hence is t-
equivalent to B ∩ C. So its standard probability equals P(B ∩ C). WRM also 
shows that the disjunction of ω((A → B) ∩ (B→ C)) with λ((A → B) ∩ (B→ C)) is 
t-equivalent to A ∪ B. So P*((A → B) ∩ (B→ C)) = P(B ∩ C) ÷ P(A ∪ B if P(A)  > 
0. Then P*(A → C) = P(A ∩ C) ÷ P(A) = P(C/A), so the question is whether 
P(C/A) can be less than P(B ∩ C) ÷ P(A ∪ B). Suppose that 0 < P(A) < 1 and  
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P(A ∩ C)  = 0; then P*(A → C) = 0. This is compatible with P(B ∩ C) > 0 and 
P(A ∪ B) > 0. Thus the argument is not FBP valid.  
   On the other hand, the t-valid argument form A → B, (A ∩ B) → C ∴ A → C - 
the Restricted Hypothetical Syllogism - is FBP-valid, and doesn't have absurd 
instances. WRM shows that the wager resolution value of a conjunction of the 
premises is W iff A and B and C  are t, and is either W or L iff A is t. So the P* 
value of a conjunction of premises equals P(A ∩ B ∩ C ) ÷ P(A) and the P* value 
of the conclusion is P(A ∩ C) ÷ P(A), provided that P(A) > 0. If P(A) = 0, both 
equal 1 by convention. Thus P*(A → C ) ≥ P*( (A → B) ∩ (A ∩ B) → C for all P.  
   The logical appraisals of the above arguments match the appraisals provided 
by Ernest Adams’s Criterion of Probabilistic Validity [1975], [1998]. However, 
as noted earlier, unlike FPB validity, Adams’s criterion is limited in scope: it does 
not treat most arguments that contain formulae with conditional sub-formulae. 
It does not guarantee that the conclusion of a probabilistically valid argument in 
Adams’s sense is at least as credible as a conjunction of premises. Adams 
constructed a concept of quasi-conjunction, but he gave it no role in the 
determination of logical soundness. The guarantee Adams’s criterion provides is 
that if n is the number of premises, and p is the average credibility-cum-
“probability” of the premises, and c is the credibility-cum-“probability”  of its 
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conclusion then if the argument is probabilistically valid, c ≥  1– n + np. For 
example if n is 2 and p is .75 then c ≥ .5.  Not particularly reassuring. 
   Facility with probabilistic computations of the sort required to test for FBP-
validity above is limited to persons who have studied mathematical probability.  
A non-probabilistic criterion that yields the same logical appraisals as FBP-
validity would be useful for most users. The criterion of Super-validity outlined 
in the next section does this job. A proof of the equivalence of FBP validity and 
Super-validity is presented in section 7.3  
6.2 Super-validity.  
  Definition: an argument of the form S1, S2,.. Sn ∴ H is super-valid iff it is t-
valid and so is d(H) ∴ d(S1 ∩ S2 ∩.. ∩ Sn).  
 For example,  A → C ∴ ∼ C → ∼ A not super-valid because d(A → C) is super-
equivalent to A → ∼ C and d(∼ C → ∼ A) is super-equivalent to ∼ C → A, which 
does not imply A → ∼ C.  The “paradoxes of material implication are not super-
valid because d(A → C), which is super-equivalent to A → ∼ C implies neither 
d(∼A) nor d(C).  
   The Hypothetical Syllogism is not super-valid because d(A → B) ∩ (B→ C) is L 
and hence u  when A is u and  B and C are t whereas in this case d(A → C) is K  
and hence t. On the other hand, the restricted Hypothetical Syllogism is super-
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valid because  A → B, (A ∩ B) → C ∴ A → C  is t-valid, and there is no 
interpretation on which d(A → C) is t and  d((A  → B) ∩ ((A ∩ B)→ C)) is u  
  A simple informal reductio argument that a super-valid argument form cannot 
have absurd instances starts with the supposition that S1, S2,.. Sn ∴ H 
represents a colloquial instance of a super-valid argument form. Then there is a 
realistic scenario on which the wager opposite of the colloquial conclusion is 
true and the conjunction of its premises is non-trivially true. Suppose that the 
proposition represented by H is absurd. Then an interpretation that models such 
a scenario assigns t to d(H) and treats S1 ∩ S2 ∩.. ∩ Sn) as non-trivially true, 
i.e., treats its wager opposite as L and u. But then  d(H) ∴ d(S1 ∩ S2 ∩.. ∩ Sn) 
is doesn’t represent a t-valid argument, hence the original argument is not 
super-valid. 
  Like FPB-validity Super-validity is non-monotonic For example, S ∴ S is trivially 
super-valid but S, H ∴S  may not be super-valid. For, suppose that S is K on 
interpretation ξ and that H is W on ξ; then S ∩ H is W and d(S ∩ H) is L and u on 
ξ, whereas  d(S) is K and t.  Hence d(S) ∴ d(S ∩ H) is not t-valid.  
   Super-validity, as well as FPB validity, disarms the claim that absurd instances 
show that MCR is untenable. For, these criteria of logical soundness are 
consistent with MCR, and allow no absurd instances of t-valid argument forms 
with conditional conclusions.  Once it is clear that the standard probability of a 
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conditional may not be an apposite measure of its credibility there is no reason 
to expect that a criterion of logical soundness whose focus is necessary truth 
preservation also should guarantee necessary credibility preservation for 
arguments that involve conditionals.  
  When our primary goal in inquiry is to discover what propositions must be true 
if others are true, t-validity is the criterion of choice; when it is to discover what 
propositions are both true and  credible credible if others are then either FPB-
validity or Super-validity does the job.  
7. Appendix: Some Promised Proofs.  
7.1 Theorem:  P*(d(S) = 1 – P*(S) provided that P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)) > 0. Proof: 
ω(d(S)) is super-equivalent to λ(S) and λ(d(S)) is super equivalent to ω(S). 
Simple algebra is all that is needed to complete the proof.  
7.2 Proof of The General Triviality Result.  
  The theorem states that for all standard probability functions P defined over 
the formulae of WRC and every formula S in the scope of P, P(S) > P*(S) if  0 < 
P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)) < 1 and P(λ(S)) > 0, and that equality obtains otherwise.  Proof:  
κ(S) is shorthand for d(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)), which is W and t if S is K, and L otherwise. 
The proof employs two Lemmas:  a) the result that since S is t-equivalent to 
ω(S) ∪ κ(S) and ω(S) and κ(S) are logically incompatible, P(S) = P(ω(S) + P(κ(S), 
and b) the result that P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S) ∪ κ(S)) = 1 = P(ω(S) + P(κ(S) + P(λ(S)).  
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   Cases 1, 2 and 3 establish the equality part of the theorem. Case 1: P(ω(S)) + 
P(λ(S)) equals zero. In this case P*(S) =1 by convention, and It follows from 
Lemma b that P(κ(S)) = 1, whence P(S) = 1. Case 2:  P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)) =1. Then 
P(κ(S)) = 0 and P*(S) = P(ω(S)) = P(S). Case 3:  P(λ(S)) = 0. If P(ω(S)) = 0, we 
are back in case 1, so suppose that P(ω(S)) > 0.  Then P*(S) = 1 and  P(ω(S) + 
P(κ(S)) = P(S) = 1.  
  The inequality part of the theorem. Case 4 : 0 < P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)) < 1 and 
P(λ(S)) > 0. Then P((κ(S) > 0.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that P*(S) ≥ 
P(S). Then [P(ω(S)) ÷ (P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S))] ≥ P(ω(S) + P(κ(S). It follows that  
(P(ω(S)) ≥ [P(ω(S))P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S))] + [P(κ(S))P(ω(S))] + [P(κ(S))P(λ(S))]. 
P(κ(S))P(ω(S)) = P(ω(S)(1 – (P(ω(S) ∪ λ(S)) by Lemma b).  It follows that 
P(ω(S) ≥ P(ω(S) + P(κ(S))P(λ(S)). But this is impossible because the second 
term in the sum is greater than zero under case 4. So P(S) > P*(S). Q.E.D.  
7.3  An argument is FBP-valid iff it is super-valid. A corollary is that FBP-validity 
implies t-validity.  
    Proof of the  'if ' part. Suppose that S1, S2 , …Sn ∴ H is  super-valid. Let ‘S’ 
stand for S1 ∩ S2 ∩  … ∩ Sn. Then S ∴ H is t-valid and d(H) ∴ d(S) is t-valid. It 
is to be shown that for all probability functions P defined over the formulae of a 
language that includes the formulae of S1, S2 , ,Sn and H, P*(H) ≥ P*(S).  
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Let ‘P’ stand for such a standard probability function. In addition to the lemmas 
of the previous proofs we make use of the theorem that an argument is t-valid 
iff  every standard probability function defined  over a language in which the 
argument is formulated assigns a probability number to the conclusion that is 
greater than or equal to the number it assigns to a conjunction of premises 
Thus if S1, S2 , …Sn ∴ H is super-valid P(H) ≥ P(S) and P(d(S)) ≥ P(d(H). It 
follows from the first inequality that  P(ω(H)) + P(κ(H)) ≥  P(ω(S)) + P(κ(S)) 
which implies that  1- P(λ(H)) ≥ 1 – P(λ(S)) and hence that P(λ(S)) ≥ P(λ(H)). 
Similarly, it follows from P(d(S)) ≥ P(d(H) that  
P(ω(d(S))) + P(κ(d(S))) ≥  P(ω(d(H)) + P(κ(d(H))). Since ω(d(S)) is super-
equivalent to λ(S)) and κ(d(S)) is super-equivalent to κ(S), this inequality 
implies that P(λ(S)) + P(κ(S) ≥  P(λ(H)) + P(κ(H), which implies that  
1 - P(ω(S) ≥ 1- P(ω(H)), whence P(ω(H)) ≥ P(ω(S).  
  Case 1. Both P(ω(S) + P(λ(S) and P(ω(H) + P(λ(H)] are non-zero and are less 
than 1.  It follows from these inequalities that O(S) and O(H) are defined and 
that O(H) ≥ O(S). It follows by simple algebra that  
O(H) ÷ [O(H) + 1] ≥ O(S) ÷ [O(S) + 1], whence P*(H) ≥ P*(S).  
Case 2 P(ω(H) + P(λ(H)] = 0. whence  P*(H) = 1 by convention and is ≥ P*(S) 
regardless of whether P(ω(S) + P(λ(S) is zero or not 
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Case 3 P(ω(H) + P(λ(H) is > 0, and P(ω(S) + P(λ(S) is zero in which case P*(S) = 
1 by convention. Then since P(λ(S) ≥ P(λ(H), P(λ(H) = 0, in which case P*(H) 
equals 1.  
   Proof of the second part: if S1, S2 , …Sn ∴ H is FPB valid it is super-valid. It is 
sufficient to prove the contrapositive: if an argument is not super-valid it is not 
FPB valid.  Case a) : S ∴ H is not t-valid. Then there exists a P such that P(H) = 
P(ω(H)) + P(κ(H)) is less than P(S) = P(ω(S)) + P(κ(S)). Among the class of 
such P there is a function such that P(κ(S)) = 0 = P(κ(H). So P(ω(H)) < P((ω(S)) 
and P(ω(S) + P(λ(S) and P(ω(H) + P(λ(H)  = 1. It follows that P*(H) < P*(S) 
whence S1, S2 , …Sn ∴ H is not FBP-valid.   
   Case b) d(H) ∴ d(S) is not t-valid. Then there is a P such that  P(ω(d(H))) >  
P(ω(d(S))), and P(κ(d(H)))  and P(κ(d(S))) are zero, in which case P((κ(H)) and  
P(κ(S) also are zero. Since P((ω(d(H))) = P((λ(H)) and P(ω(d(S))) = P((λ(S)), 
= P((λ(H)) > P(λ(S)) whence P(ω(H)) < P(ω(S)). It follows that O(H) < O(S) 
whence P*(H) < P*(S) and the argument is not FBP-valid. Q.E.D.  
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